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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a small Keynesian model of economic growth which is centered around
two advancedtypes of Phillips curves, one for money wages and one for prices, both being augmen-
ted by perfect myopic foresight and supplemented by a measure of the medium-term inﬂationary
climate updated in an adaptive fashion. The model contains two potentially destabilizing feedback
chains, the so-called Mundell and Rose-effects. We estimate parsimonious and congruent Phillips
curvesfor moneywages and prices in the US over the past ﬁve decades. Using the parametersof the
empirical Phillips curves, we show that the growth path of the private sector of the model economy
is likely to be surrounded by centrifugal forces. Convergence to this growth path can be generated
in two ways: a Blanchard-Katz-type error-correction mechanism in the money-wage Phillips curve
or a modiﬁed Taylor rule that is augmented by a term, which transmits increases in the wage share
(real unit labor costs) to increases in the nominal rate of interest. Thus the model is characterized
by local instability of the wage-price spiral, which however can be tamed by appropriate wage or
monetary policies. Our empirical analysis ﬁnds the error-correctionmechanism being ineffective in
both Phillips curves suggesting that the stability of the post-war US macroeconomyoriginates from
the stabilizing role of monetary policy.
JEL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM: E24, E31, E32, J30.
KEYWORDS: Phillipscurves; Mundelleffect; Rose effect; Monetarypolicy; TaylorRule; Inﬂation;
Unemployment; Instability.
RUNNING HEAD: Wage and Price Phillips curves.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Phillips curve(s)
Following the seminal work in Phillips (1958) on the relation between unemployment and the rate of
change of money wage rates in the UK, the ‘Phillips curve’ was to play an important role in macroeco-
nomics during the 1960s and 1970s, and modiﬁed so as to incorporate inﬂation expectations, survived
for much longer. The discussion on the proper type and the functional shape of the Phillips curve has
never come to a real end and is indeed now at least as lively as it has been at any other time after the
appearance of Phillips (1958) seminal paper. Recent examples for this observation are provided by the
paper of Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), where again a new type of Phillips curve is investigated,
and the paper by Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1999) on the typical shape of the expectations augmented
price inﬂation Phillips curve. Blanchard and Katz (1999) investigate the role of an error-correction wage
share inﬂuence theoretically as well as empirically and Plasmans, Meersman, van Poeck and Merlevede
(1999) investigate on this basis the impact of the generosity of the unemployment beneﬁt system on the
adjustment speed of money wages with regard to demand pressure in the market for labor.
Much of the literature has converged on the so-called ‘New Keynesian Phillips curve’, based on
Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Indeed, McCallum (1997) has called it the “closest thing there is to
a standard formulation”. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) have used a version of it as the basis for
deriving some general principles about monetary policy. However, as has been recently pointed out by
Mankiw (2001): “Although the new Keynesian Phillips curves has many virtues, it also has one striking
vice: It is completely at odd with the facts”. The problems arise from the fact that although the price
level is sticky in this model, the inﬂation rate can change quickly. By contrast, empirical analyses of the
inﬂation process (see, inter alia, Gordon, 1997) typically give a large role to ‘inﬂation inertia’.
Rarely, however, at least on the theoretical level, is note taken of the fact that there are in principle
two relationships of the Phillips curve type involved in the interaction of unemployment and inﬂation,
namely one on the labor market, the Phillips (1958) curve, and one on the market for goods, normally
not considered a separate Phillips curve, but merged with the other one by assuming that prices are a
constant mark-up on wages or the like, an extreme case of the price Phillips curve that we shall consider
in this paper.
For researchers with a background in structural macroeconometric model building it is, however,
not at all astonishing to use two Phillips curves in the place of only one in order to model the interacting
dynamics of labor and goods market adjustment processes or the wage-price spiral for simplicity. Thus,
for example, Fair (2000) has recently reconsidered the debate on the NAIRU from this perspective,
though he still uses demand pressure on the market for labor as proxy for that on the market for goods
(see Chiarella and Flaschel, 2000 for a discussion of his approach).
In this paper we, by contrast, start from a traditional approach to the discussion of the wage-price
spiral which uses different measures for demand and cost pressure on the market for labor and on
the market for goods and which distinguishes between temporary and permanent cost pressure changes.
Despite its traditional background – not unrelated however to modern theories of wage and price setting,
see appendices A.2 and A.3– we are able to show that an important macrodynamic feedback mechanism
can be detected in this type of wage – price spiral that has rarely been investigated in the theoretical as
well as in the applied macroeconomic literature with respect to its implications for macroeconomic
stability. For the US economy we then show by detailed estimation, using the software package PcGets
of Hendry and Krolzig (2001), that this feedback mechanism tends to be a destabilizing one. We ﬁnally
demonstrate on this basis that a certain error correction term in the money-wage Phillips curve or a3
Taylor interest rate policy rules that is augmented by a wage gap term can dominate such instabilities
when operated with sufﬁcient strength.
1.2 Basic macro feedback chains. A reconsideration
The Mundell effect
The investigation of destabilizing macrodynamic feedback chains has indeed never been at the center of
interest of mainstream macroeconomic analysis, though knowledge about these feedback chains dates
back to the beginning of dynamic Keynesian analysis. Tobin has presented summaries and modeling of
such feedback chains on various occasions (see in particular Tobin, 1975, 1989 and 1993). The well-
known Keynes effect as well as Pigou effect are however often present in macrodynamic analysis, since
they have the generally appreciated property of being stabilizing with respect to wage inﬂation as well
as wage deﬂation. Also well-known, but rarely taken serious, is the so-called Mundell effect based the
impact of inﬂationary expectations on investment as well as consumption demand. Tobin (1975) was
the ﬁrst who modeled this effect in a 3D dynamic framework (see Scarth, 1996 for a textbook treatment
of Tobin’s approach). Yet, though an integral part of traditional Keynesian IS-LM-PC analysis, the role
of the Mundell is generally played down as for example in Romer (1996, p.237) where it only appears in
the list of problems, but not as part of his presentation of traditional Keynesian theories of ﬂuctuations
in his chapter 5.
Figure 1 provides a brief characterization of the destabilizing feedback chain underlying the Mun-
dell effect. We consider here the case of wage and price inﬂation (though deﬂation may be the more
problematic case, since there is an obvious downward ﬂoor to the evolution of the nominal rate of in-
terest (and the working of the well-known Keynes effect) which, however, in the partial reasoning that





















Figure 1 Destabilizing Mundell effects.
For a given nominal rate of interest, increasing inﬂation (caused by an increasing activity level of
the economy) by deﬁnition leads to a decrease of the real rate of interest. This stimulates demand for
investment and consumer durables even further and thus leads, via the multiplier process to further
increasing economic activity in both the goods and the labor markets, adding further momentum to the
ongoing inﬂationary process. In the absence of ceilings to such an inﬂationary spiral, economic activity
will increase to its limits and generate an ever accelerating inﬂationary spiral eventually. This standard4
feedback chain of traditional Keynesian IS-LM-PC analysis is however generally neglected and has thus
not really been considered in its interaction with the stabilizing Keynes- and Pigou effect, with works
based on the seminal paper of Tobin (1975) being the exception (see Groth, 1993, for a brief survey on
this type of literature).
Far more neglected is however an – in principle – fairly obvious real wage adjustment mechanism
that was ﬁrst investigated analytically in Rose (1967) with respect to its local and global stability im-
plications (see also Rose, 1990). Due to this heritage, this type of effect has been called Rose effect
in Chiarella and Flaschel (2000), there investigated in its interaction with the Keynes- and the Mundell
effect, and the Metzler inventory accelerator, in a 6D Keynesian model of goods and labor market dis-
equilibrium. In the present paper we intend to present and analyze the working of this effect in a very
simple IS growth model – without the LM curve as in Romer (2000) – and thus with a direct interest
rate policy in the place of indirect money supply targeting and its use of the Keynes effect (based on
stabilizing shifts of the conventional LM-curve). We classify theoretically and estimate empirically the
types of Rose effects that are at work, the latter for the case of the US economy.
Stabilizing or destabilizing Rose effects?
Rose effects are present if the income distribution is allowed to enter the formation of Keynesian effect-
ive demand and if wage dynamics is distinguished from price dynamics, both aspects of macrodynamics
that are generally neglected at least in the theoretical macroeconomic literature. This may explain why
Rose effects are rarely present in the models used for policy analysis and policy discussions.
Rose effects are however of great interest and have been present since long – though unnoticed and
not in full generality – in macroeconometric model building, where wage and price inﬂation on the one
hand and consumption and investment behavior on the other hand are generally distinguished from each
other. Rose effects allow for at least four different cases depending on whether consumption demand
responds stronger than investment demand to real wage changes (or vice versa) and whether – broadly
speaking – wages are more ﬂexible than prices with respect to the demand pressures on the market for
labor and for goods, respectively. Theﬁgures 2 and 3 present twoout of the four possible cases, all based
on the assumption that consumption demand depends positively and investment demand negatively on
the real wage (or the wage share if technological change is present).
In ﬁgure 2 we consider ﬁrst the case where the real wage dynamics taken by itself is stabilizing.
Here we present the case where wages are more ﬂexible with respect to demand pressure (in the market
for labor) than prices (with respect to demand pressure in the market for goods) and where investment
responds stronger than consumption to changes in the real wage. We consider again the case of inﬂa-
tion. The case of deﬂation is of course of the same type with all shown arrows simply being reversed.
Nominal wages rising faster than prices means that real wages are increasing when activity levels are
high. Therefore, investment is depressed more than consumption is increased, giving rise to a decrease
in aggregate as well as effective demand. The situation on the market for goods – and on this basis also
on the market for labor – is therefore deteriorating, implying that forces come into being that stop the
rise in wages and prices eventually and that may – if investigated formally – lead the economy back to
the position of normal employment and stable wages and prices.
The stabilizing forces just discussed however become destabilizing if price adjustment speeds are
reversed and thus prices rising faster than nominal wages, see ﬁgure 3. In this case, we get falling real
wages and thus – on the basis of the considered propensities to consume and invest with respect to real
wage changes – further increasing aggregate and effective demand on the goods market which is trans-


















Figure 2 Normal Rose effects.
(in weaker form) rising wages. This adverse type of real wage adjustment or simply adverse Rose effect
can go on for ever if there is no nonlinearity present that modiﬁes either investment or consumption be-
havior or wage and price adjustment speeds such that normal Rose effects are established again, though


















Figure 3 Adverse Rose effects..
Since the type of Rose effect depends on the relative size of marginal propensities to consume and to
invest and on the ﬂexibility of wages vs. that of prices we are confronted with a question that demands
for empirical estimation. Furthermore, Phillips curves for wages and prices have to be speciﬁed in more
1The type of Rose effect shown in ﬁgure 3 may be considered as the one that characterizes practical macro-wisdom
which generally presumes that prices are more ﬂexible than wages and that IS goods market equilibrium – if at all – depends
negatively on real wages. Our empirical ﬁndings show that both assumptions are not conﬁrmed, but indeed both reversed by
data of the US economy, which taken together however continues to imply that empirical Rose effects are adverse in nature.6
detail than discussed so far, in particular due to the fact that also cost pressure and expected cost pressure
do matter in them, not only demand pressure on the market for goods and for labor. These speciﬁcations
will lead to the result that also the degree of short-sightedness of wage earners and of ﬁrms will matter
in the following discussion of Rose effects. Our empirical ﬁndings in this regard will be that wages are
considerably more ﬂexible than prices with respect to demand pressure, and workers roughly equally
short-sighted as ﬁrms with respect to cost pressure. On the basis of the assumption that consumption
is more responsive than investment to temporary real wage changes, we then get that all arrows and
hierarchies shown in ﬁgure 3 will be reversed. We thus get by this twofold change in the ﬁgure 3 again
an adverse Rose effect in the interaction of income distribution dependent changes in goods demand
with wage and price adjustment speeds on the market for labor and for goods.
1.3 Outline of the paper
Inview of the above hypothesis, the paper isorganized asfollows. Section 2presents asimple Keynesian
macrodynamic model where advanced wage and price adjustment rules are introduced and in the center
of the considered model and where – in addition – income distribution and real rates of interest matter
in the formation of effective goods demand. We then investigate some stability implications of this
macrodynamic model, there for the case where Rose effects are stabilizing, as in ﬁgure 2, due to an
assumed dominance of investment behavior in effective demand and to sluggish price dynamics as well
as sluggish inﬂationary expectations, concerning what we will call the inﬂationary climate surrounding
the perfectly foreseen current inﬂation rate. We thus consider the joint occurrence of stable Rose and
weak Mundell effects, but still do not ﬁnd stability of the steady growth path in such a situation. A
standard type of interest rate policy rule2is therefore subsequently introduced to enforce convergence to
the steady state, indeed also for fast revisions of inﬂationary expectations and thus stronger destabilizing
Mundell effects. Section 3 investigates empirically whether the type of Rose effect assumed in section 2
is really the typical one. We ﬁnd evidence (in the case of the US economy) that wages are indeed more
ﬂexible than prices. Increasing wage ﬂexibility is thus bad for economic stability (while price ﬂexibility
is not) when coupled with the observation that consumption demand responds stronger than investment
demand to temporary real wage changes.
In section 4, this type of destabilizing Rose effect is then incorporated into our small macrodynamic
model and the question of whether and which type of interest rate policy can stabilize the economy in
such a situation is reconsidered. We ﬁnd that a standard Taylor interest rate rule is not sufﬁcient due to
its speciﬁc tailoring that only allows to combat the Mundell type feedback chain – which it indeed can
ﬁght successfully. In case of a destabilizing Rose or real wage effect the tailoring of such a Taylor rule
must be reﬂected again in order to ﬁnd out what type of rule can ﬁght such Rose effects. We here ﬁrst
reintroduce wage share effects considered by Blanchard and Katz (1999) into the money-wage Phillips
curve which – when sufﬁciently strong – will stabilize a system operating under standard Taylor rule.
Alternatively, however, the Taylor rule can be modiﬁed to include an income distribution term, which
enforces convergence in the case where the wage share effect in the money wage Phillips curve is too
weak to guarantee this.
Weconclude that therole ofincome distribution inproperly formulated wage-price spirals represents
an important topic that is very much neglected in the modern discussion of inﬂation, disinﬂation and
deﬂation.
2The discussion of such interest rate or Taylor policy rules originates from Taylor (1993), see Taylor (1999a), for a recent
debate of such monetary policy rules and Clarida and Gertler (1998) for an empirical study of Taylor feedback rules in selected
OECD countries.7
2 A model of the wage–price spiral
This section brieﬂy presents an elaborate form of the wage-price dynamics or the wage-price spiral
and a simple theory of effective goods demand, which however gives income distribution a role in the
growth dynamics derived from these building blocks. The presentation of this model is completed with
respect to the budget equations for the four sectors of the model in the appendix A.1 to this paper. The
wage-price spiral will be estimated, using US data, in section 3 of the paper.
2.1 The wage-price spiral
At the core of the dynamics to be modeled, estimated and analyzed in this and the following sections is
the description of the money wage and price adjustment processes. They are provided by the following
equations (1) and (2):
ˆ w = βw1(¯ Ul − Ul) − βw2(u − uo)+κw(ˆ p + nx)+( 1− κw)(π + nx), (1)
ˆ p = βp1(¯ Uc − Uc)+βp2(u − uo)+κp(ˆ w − nx)+( 1− κp)π. (2)
In these equations for wage inﬂation ˆ w =˙ w/w and price inﬂation ˆ p =˙ p/p we denote by Ul and
Uc the rate of unemployment of labor and capital, respectively, and by nx the rate of Harrod–neutral
technological change. u is the wage share, u = wLd/pY .
Demand pressure in the market for labor is characterized by deviations of the rate of unemployment
Ul from its NAIRU level ¯ Ul. Similarly demand pressure in the market for goods is represented by
deviations of the rate of underemployment Uc of the capital stock K from its normal underemployment
level ¯ Uc, assumed to be ﬁxed by ﬁrms. Wage and price inﬂation are therefore ﬁrst of all driven by their
corresponding demand pressure terms.
With respect to the role of the wage share u, which augments the Phillips curves by the terms
βw2(u − uo) and βp2(u − uo), we assume that increasing shares will dampen the evolution of wage
inﬂation and give further momentum to price inﬂation (see Franke, 2001, for details of the effects of a
changing income distribution on demand driven wage and price inﬂation). As far as the money-wage
Phillips curve is concerned, this corresponds to the error-correction mechanism in Blanchard and Katz
(1999). In appendix A.2, we motivate this assumption within a wage-bargaining model. A similar,
though less strong formulation has been proposed by Ball and Moﬁtt (2001), who – based on fairness
considerations – integrate the difference between productivity growth and an average of past real-wage
growth in a wage-inﬂation Phillips curve.
In addition to demand pressure we have also cost–pressure terms in the laws of motions for nominal
wages and prices, of crossover type and augmented by productivity change in the case of wages and
diminished by productivity change in the case of prices. As the wage–price dynamics are formulated we
assume that myopic perfect foresight prevails, of workers with respect to their measure of cost pressure,
ˆ p, and of ﬁrms with respect to wage pressure, ˆ w. In this respect we follow the rational expectations
school and disregard model–inconsistent expectations with respect to short-run inﬂation rates. Yet, in
the present framework, current inﬂation rates are not the only measuring root for cost pressure, so they
enter wage and price inﬂation only with weight κw ∈ [0,1] and κp ∈ [0,1], respectively, and κwκp < 1.
In addition, both workers and ﬁrms (or at least one of them) look at the inﬂationary climate surrounding
current inﬂation rates.
A novel element in such cost-pressure terms is here given by the term π, representing the inﬂationary8
climate in which current inﬂation is embedded. Since the inﬂationary climate envisaged by economic
agents changes sluggishly, information about macroeconomic conditions diffuses slowly through the
economy (see Mankiw and Reis, 2001), wage and price are set staggered (see Taylor, 1999b), it is not
unnatural to assume that agents, in the light of past inﬂationary experience, update π by an adaptive
rule. In the theoretical model,3 we assume that the medium-run inﬂation beliefs are updated adaptively
in the standard way:
˙ π = βπ(ˆ p − π). (3)
In two appendices A.2, A.3 we provide some further justiﬁcations for the two Phillips curves here
assumed to characterize the dynamics of the wage and the price level. Note that the inﬂationary climate
expression has often been employed in applied work by including lagged inﬂation rates in price Phillips
curves, see Fair (2000) for example. Here however it is justiﬁed from the theoretical perspective, separ-
ating temporary from permanent effects, where temporary changes in both price and wage inﬂation are
even perfectly foreseen. We show in this respect in section 2.4 that the interdependent wage and price
Phillips curves can however be solved for wage and price inﬂation explicitly, giving rise to two reduced
form expressions where the assumed perfect foresight expressions do not demand for forward induction.
For the theoretical investigation, the dynamical equations (1)-(3) representing the laws of motion
of w, p and π are part of a complete growth model to be supplemented by simple expressions for
production, consumption and investment demand and – due to the latter – also by a law of motion for
the capital stock. These equations will allow the discussion of so–called Mundell and Rose effects
in the simplest way possible and are thus very helpful in isolating these effects from other important
macrodynamic feedback chains which are not the subject of this paper. The econometric analysis to be
presented in the following section will focus on the empirical counterparts of the Phillips curves (1) and
(2) while conditioning on the other macroeconomic variables which enter these equations.
2.2 Technology
In this and the next subsection we complete our model of the wage price spiral in the simples way
possible to allow for the joint occurrence of Mundell and Rose effects in the considered economy.
For the sake of simplicity we employ in this paper a ﬁxed proportions technology:4
yp = Y p/K = const. ,x= Y/Ld, ˆ x =˙ x/x = nx = const.









Y p − Y
Y p =1−
Y
Y p =1− y/yp
where y denotes the output–capital ratio Y/K and k = K/(xL) a speciﬁc measure of capital–intensity
or the full employment capital - output ratio. We assume Harrod–neutral technological change: ˆ yp =
0, ˆ x = nx = const., with a given potential output-capital ratio yp and labor productivity x = Y/Ld
growing at a constant rate. We have to use k in the place of K/L, the actual full employment capital
intensity, in order to obtain state variables that allow for a steady state later on.
3In the empirical part of the paper we will simplify these calculations further by measuring the inﬂationary climate variable
π as a 12 quarter moving average of ˆ p.
4We neglect capital stock depreciation in this paper.9
2.3 Aggregate goods demand
As far as consumption is concerned we assume Kaldorian differentiated saving habits of the classical
type (sw =1− cw =1− c ≥ 0,s c =1 ) , i.e., real consumption is given by:
C = cuY = cωLd,u = ω/x,ω = w/p the real wage (4)




= i((1 − u)y − (r − π)) + n, y =
Y
K
,n= ˆ L +ˆ x = n + nx trend growth (5)
The rate of investment is therefore basically driven by the return differential between ρ =( 1−u)y,
t h er a t eo fp r o ﬁ to fﬁ r m sa n dr−π, the real rateof interest on long–term bonds (consols), only considered
in its relation to the budget restrictions of the four sectors of the model (workers, asset-holders, ﬁrms
and the government) in appendix A.1 to this paper.5
This ﬁnancial asset is needed for the generation of Mundell (or real rate of interest) effects in the
model, which as we will show later can be neutralized by a Taylor-rule.
Besides consumption and investment demand we also consider the goods demand G of the govern-
ment where we however for simplicity assume g = G/K =const., since ﬁscal policy is not a topic of
the present paper.
2.4 The laws of motion
Dueto theassumed demand behavior of households, ﬁrmsand the government wehave asrepresentation
of goods–market equilibrium in per unit of capital form (y = Y/K):
cuy + i((1 − u)y − (r − π)) + n + g = y (6)
and as law of motion for the full–employment capital–output ratio k = K/(xL):
ˆ k = i((1 − u)y − (r − π)). (7)
Equations (1), (2) furthermore give in reduced form the two laws of motion (8), (9), with κ =
(1 − κwκp)−1:






l) − βw2(u − uo)
 







ˆ p = π + κ
 
βp1(¯ Uc − Uc)+βp2(u − uo)+κp
 
βw1(¯ Ul − Ul) − βw2(u − uo)
  
(9)
The ﬁrst equation describes the law of motion for the wage share u which depends positively on
the demand pressure items on the market for labor (for κp < 1) and negatively on those of the market
for goods (for κw < 1).6 The second equation is a reduced form price Phillips curve which combines
5We consider the long-term rate r as determinant of investment behavior in this paper, but neglect here the short-term rate
and its interaction with the long-term rate – as it is for example considered in Blanchard and Fisher (1999, 10.4) – in order to
keep the model concentrated on the discussion of Mundell and Rose effects. We thus abstract from dynamical complexities
caused by the term structure of interest rates. Furthermore, we do not consider a climate expression for the evolution of
nominal interest, in contrast to our treatment of inﬂation, in order to restrict the dynamics to dimension 3.
6The law of motion (8) for the wage share u is obtained by making use in addition of the following reduced form equation
for ˆ w which is obtained simultaneously with the one for ˆ p a n do fav e r ys i m i l a rt y p e :












all demand pressure related items on labor and goods market in a positive fashion (for κp > 0). This
equation is far more advanced than the usual price Phillips curve of the literature.7 Inserted into the ad-
aptive revision rule for the inﬂationary climate variable it provides as further law of motion the dynamic
equation
˙ π = βπκ
 
βp1(¯ Uc − Uc)+βp2(u − uo)+κp
 
βw1(¯ Ul − Ul) − βw2(u − uo)
  
(10)
We assume for the time being that the interest rate r on long-term bonds is kept ﬁxed at its steady-
state value ro and then get that equations (7), (8) and (10), supplemented by the static goods market
equilibrium equation (5), provide an autonomous system of differential equations in the state variables
u,k and π.
Itisobvious from equation (8)that theerror correction terms βw2,β p2 exercise astabilizing inﬂuence
on the adjustment of the wage share (when this dynamic is considered in isolation). The other two
β−terms (the demand pressure terms), however, do not give rise to a clear-cut result for the wage share
subdynamic. In fact, they can be reduced to the following expression as far as the inﬂuence of economic
activity, as measured by y, is concerned (neglecting irrelevant constants):
κ[(1 − κp)βw1k − (1 − κw)βp1/yp] · y
In the case where output y depends negatively on the wage share u we thus get partial stability for
the wage share adjustment (as in the case of the error correction terms) if and only if the term in square
brackets is negative (which is the case for βw1 sufﬁciently large). We have called this a normal Rose
effect in section 1, which in the present case derives – broadly speaking – from investment sensitivity
being sufﬁciently high and wage ﬂexibility dominance.
In the case where output y depends positively on u, where therefore consumption is dominating
investment with respect to the inﬂuence of real wage changes, we need a large βp1, and thus a sufﬁcient
degree of price ﬂexibility relative to the degree of wage ﬂexibility, to guarantee stability from the partial
perspective of real wage adjustments. For these reasons we will therefore call the condition











the critical or α condition for the occurrence of normal (adverse) Rose effects, in the case where the
ﬂexibility of wages (of prices) with respect to demand pressure is dominating the wage-price spiral
(including the weights concerning the relevance of myopic perfect foresight). In the next section we
will provide estimates for this critical condition in order to see which type of Rose effect might have
been the one involved in the business ﬂuctuations of the US economy in the post-war period.
Note ﬁnally with respect to equation (9) and (10) that ˙ π always depends positively on y and thus on
π,s i n c ey always depends positively on π. This latter dependence of accelerator type as well as the role
of wage share adjustments will be further clariﬁed in the next subsection.
2.5 The effective demand function
The goods–market equilibrium condition (6) can be solved for y and gives
y =
n + g − i(ro − π)
(1 − u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u
. (11)
7Note however that this reduced form Phillips curve becomes formally identical to the one normally investigated empir-
ically, see Fair (2000) for example, if βw2,β p2 =0holds and if Okun’s law is assumed to hold (i.e. the utilization rates of
labor and capital are perfectly correlated). However, even then the estimated coefﬁcients are far away from representing labor
market characteristics solely.11
We assume i ∈ (0,1),c∈ (0,1] and consider only cases where u<1 is fulﬁlled which, in particular, is
true close to the steady state. This implies that the output–capital ratio y depends positively on π.
Whether y is increasing or decreasing in the labor share u depends on the relative size of c and i.
In the case of c =1 , we get the following dependencies:
yu =
(n + g − i(ro − π))(i − 1)




ρu = −y − (1 − u)yu =0 .
As long as y is positive and u smaller than one, we get a positive dependence of y on u. The rate of
proﬁt ρ is independent of the wage share u due to a balance between the negative cost and the positive
demand effect of the wage share u.8




(1 − i)(1 − u)+( 1− c)u
≥ 0 iff c ≥ i, (12)
ρu = −y +( 1− u)yu < 0, (13)
where the result for the rate of proﬁt ρ =( 1− u)y of ﬁrms follows from the fact that yu clearly is
smaller than y/(1 − u).
Therefore, if a negative relationship between the rate of return and the wage share is desirable
(given the investment function deﬁned in equation 7), then for the workers consumption function, the
assumption c<1 is required: C/K = cuy,c ∈ (0,1).
2.6 Stability issues
We consider in this subsection the fully interacting, but somewhat simpliﬁed 3D growth dynamics of
the model which consist the following three laws of motion (14) – (16) for the wage share u, the full
employment capital-output ratio k and the inﬂationary climate π:9
ˆ u = κ[(1 − κp)(βw1(¯ Ul − Ul) − βw2(u − uo)) − (1 − κw)βp1(¯ Uc − Uc)], (14)
ˆ k = i((1 − u)y − (r − π)), (15)
˙ π = βπκ[βp1(¯ Uc − Uc)+κp(βw1(¯ Ul − Ul) − βw2(u − uo))], (16)
where Ul =1− yk and Uc =1− y/yp.
During this section, we will impose the following set of assumptions:10
8We note that the investment function can be modiﬁed in various ways, for example by inserting the normal-capacity-
utilization rate of proﬁt ρ
n =( 1− u)(1 − ¯ U
c)y
p into it in the place of the actual rate ρ, which then always gives rise to a
negative effect of u on this rate ρ
n and also makes subsequent calculations simpler. Note here also that we only pursue local
stability analysis in this paper and thus work for reasons of simplicity with linear functions throughout.
9We therefore now assume – for reasons of simplicity – that βp2 =0holds throughout, a not very restrictive assumption
in the light of what is shown in the remainder of this paper. Note here that two of the three laws of motion (for the wage share
and the inﬂationary climate) are originating from the wage-price spiral considered in this paper, while the third one (for the
capital output ratio) represents by and large the simplest addition possible to arrive at a model on the macro level that can be
considered complete.
10In section 4 we will relax these assumptions in various ways.12
(A.1) The marginal propensity to consume is strictly less than the one to invest: 0 <c<i .
(A.2) The money-wage Phillips curve is not error-correcting w.r.t. the wage share: βw2 =0 .
(A.3) The parameters satisfy that uo ∈ (0,1) and πo ≥ 0 hold in the steady state.
(A.4a) The nominal interest rate r is constant: r = ro.
(A.4b) There is an interest rate policy rule in operation which is of the type:
r = ρo + π + βr(π − ¯ π)
with βr > 0, ρo the steady-state real rate of interest, and ¯ π the inﬂation target.
Assumption (A.1) implies that (i) yu < 0 as in (12), (ii) Ul
u > 0 and Uc
u > 0 since the negative effect
of real wage increases on investment outweighs the positive effect on consumption, and (iii) ρu < 0
with ρ =( 1− u)y (the alternative scenario with c>iis considered in section 4). (A.2) excludes the
potentially stabilizing effects of the Blanchard-Katz-type error-correction mechanism (will be discussed
in section 4.2 for the money-wage Phillips curve). (A.3) ensures the existence of an interior steady state.
Assumptions (A.4a) and (A.4b) stand for different monetary regimes and determine the nominal interest
rate in (15) and the algebraic equation for the effective demand which supplements the 3D dynamics.
For the neutral monetary policy deﬁned in (A.4a), we have that output y is an increasing function of
the inﬂationary climate π:
y =
n + g + i(π − ro)
(1 − u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u
. (17)
By contrast, assumption (A.4b), the adoption of a Taylor interest rate policy rule, implies that the static
equilibrium condition is given by
y =
n + g − i(ρ0 + βr(π − ¯ π))
(1 − i)(1 − u)+( 1− c)u
. (18)
which implies a negative dependence of output y on the inﬂationary climate π.11
Proposition 1. (The Unique Interior Steady State Position)
Under assumptions (A.1) - (A.4a), the interior steady state of the dynamics (14) – (16) is
uniquely determined and given by
y0 =( 1− ¯ Uc)yp,k 0 =( 1− ¯ Ul)/yo,u 0 =1 /c +( n + g)/y0,ρ o =( 1− uo)yo.
Steady-state inﬂation in the constant nominal interest regime (A.4a) is given by:
πo = ro − (1 − uo)yo,
and under the interest rule (A.4b) we have that:
πo =¯ π, ro = ρo +¯ π
holds true.
11Note that our formulation of a Taylor rule ignores the inﬂuence of a variable representing the output gap. Including the
capacity utilization gap of ﬁrms would however only add a positive constant to the denominator of the fraction just considered
and would therefore not alter our results in a signiﬁcant way. Allowing for the output gap in addition to the inﬂation gap may
also be considered as some sort of double counting.13
The proof of proposition 1 is straightforward. The proofs of the following propositions are in the math-
ematical appendix A.5.
The steady state solution with constant nominal interest rate (A.4a) shows that the demand side has
no inﬂuence on the long-run output-capital ratio, but inﬂuences the income distribution and the long-run
rate of inﬂation. In the case of an adjusting nominal rate of interest (A.4b), the steady state rate of
inﬂation is determined by the monetary authority and its steering of the nominal rate of interest, while
the steady-state rate of interest is obtained from the steady rate of return of ﬁrms and the inﬂationary
target of the central bank.
Proposition 2. (Private Sector Instability)
Under assumptions (A.1) - (A.4a), the interior steady state of the dynamics (14) – (16) is
essentially repelling (exhibits at least one positive root), even for small parameters βp1,β π.
A normal Rose effect (stability by wage ﬂexibility and instability by price ﬂexibility in the con-
sidered case c<i ) and a weak Mundell effect (sluggish adjustment of prices and of the inﬂationary
climate variable) are thus not sufﬁcient to generate convergence to the steady state.12
Proposition 3. (Interest Rate Policy and Stability)
Under assumptions (A.1) - (A.3), the interest rule in (A.4b) implies asymptotic stability of
the steady state for any given adjustment speeds βπ > 0 if the price ﬂexibility parameter
βp1 is sufﬁciently small.
As long as price ﬂexibility does not give rise to an adverse Rose effect (dominating the trace of
the Jacobian of the dynamics at the steady state), we get convergence to the steady state by monetary
policy and the implied adjustments of the long-term real rate of interest r − π which increase r beyond
its steady state value whenever the inﬂationary climate exceeds the target value ¯ π and vice versa.T h e
present stage of the investigation therefore suggests that wage ﬂexibility (relative to price ﬂexibility),
coupled with the assumption c>iand an active interest rate policy rule is supporting macroeconomic
stability. The question however is whether this is the situation that characterizes factual macroeconomic
behavior.
An adverse Rose effect (due to price ﬂexibility and c<i ) would dominate the stability implications
of the considered dynamics: the system would then lose its stability by way of a Hopf–bifurcation when
the reaction parameter βr of the interest rate rule is made sufﬁciently small. However, we will ﬁnd
in the next section that wages are more ﬂexible than prices with respect to demand pressure on their
respective markets. We thus have in the here considered case c<ithat the Rose effect can be neglected
(as not endangering economic stability), while the destabilizing Mundell effect can indeed be tamed by
an appropriate monetary policy rule.
3 Estimating the US wage-price spiral
In this section we analyze US post-war data to provide an estimate of the two Phillips curves that form
the core of the dynamical model introduced in section 2. Using PcGets (see Hendry and Krolzig, 2001),
we start with a general, dynamic, unrestricted, linear model of ˆ w − πt and ˆ p − πt which is conditioned
on the explanatory variables predicted by the theory and use the general-to-speciﬁc approach to ﬁnd an
12In the mathematical appendix A.5, it is shown that the carrier of the Mundell effect, ˙ ππ, will always give the wrong sign
to the determinant of the Jacobian of the dynamics at the steady state.14
Table 1 Data.
Variable Transformation Mnemonic Description of the untransformed series
Ul UNRATE/100 UNRATE Unemployment Rate
Uc 1−CUMFG/100 CUMFG Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing. Percent of Capacity
w log(COMPNFB) COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour, 1992=100
p log(GNPDEF) GNPDEF Gross National Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator, 1992=100






COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour, 1992=100
Note that w,p,ld,y,unow denote the logs of wages, prices, employed labor, output and the wage share (1992=1) so that
ﬁrst differences can be used to denote their rates of growth. Similar results are obtained when measuring the wage share as
unit labor costs (nonfarm business sector) adjusted by the GNP deﬂator.
undominated parsimonious representation of the structure of the data. From these estimates, the long-
run Phillips curves can be obtained which describe the total effects of variables and allow a comparison
to the reduced form of the wage-price spiral in (1) and (2).
3.1 Data
The data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (see http://www.stls.frb.org/fred). The
data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted and are all available from 1948:1 to 2001:2. Except for the
unemployment rates of the factors labor, Ul, and capital, Uc, the log of the series are used (see table 1).
For reasons of simplicity as well as empirical reasons, we measure the inﬂationary climate surround-







This moving average provides a simple approximation of the adaptive expectations mechanism (3) con-
sidered in section 2, which deﬁnes the inﬂation climate as an inﬁnite, weighted moving average of past
inﬂation rates with declining weights. The assumption here is that people apply a certain window (three
years) to past observations, here of size, without signiﬁcantly discounting.
The data to be modeled are plotted in ﬁgure 4. The estimation sample is 1955:1 - 2001:2 which
excludes the Korean war. The number of observations used for the estimation is 186.
3.2 The money-wage Phillips curve
Let us ﬁrst provide an estimate of the wage Phillips curve (1) of this paper: We model wage inﬂation in
deviation from the inﬂation climate, ∆w − π, conditional on its own past, the history of price inﬂation,
∆p − π, measured by the same type of deviations, overall labor productivity growth, ∆y − ∆ld,t h e
unemployment rate, Ul, and the log of the labor share, u = w + ld − p − y, by means of the equation
(19):
∆wt − πt = νw +
5  
j=1
γwwj (∆wt−j − πt−j)+
5  
j=1













t−j + αwut−1 + εwt, (19)15





























Figure 4 Price and Wage Inﬂation, Unemployment and the Wage Share.
where εwt is a white noise process. The general model explains 43.7% of the variation of ∆wt − πt
reducing the standard error in the prediction of quarterly changes of the wage level to 0.467%:
RSS 0.003551 ˆ σ 0.004653 R2 0.4373 ¯ R2 0.3653
lnL 1011 AIC −10.6298 HQ −10.4752 SC −10.2482
Almost all of the estimated coefﬁcients of (19) are statistically insigniﬁcant and therefore not repor-
ted here. This highlights the idea of the general-to-speciﬁc (Gets) approach (see Hendry, 1995, for an
overview of the underlying methodology) of selecting a more compact model, which is nested in the
general but provides an improved statistical description of the economic reality by reducing the com-
plexity of the model and checking the contained information. The PcGets reduction process is designed
to ensure that the reduced model will convey all the information embodied in the unrestricted model
(which is here provided by equation 19). This is achieved by a joint selection and diagnostic testing
process: starting from the unrestricted, congruent general model, standard testing procedures are used
to eliminate statistically-insigniﬁcant variables, with diagnostic tests checking the validity of reductions,
ensuring a congruent ﬁnal selection.
Inthe case ofthe general wagePhillips curve in(19), PcGetsreduces thenumber ofcoefﬁcients from
22 to only 3, resulting in a parsimonious money-wage Phillips curve, which just consists of the demand
pressure Ul
t−1, the cost pressure ∆pt−1−πt−1 and a constant (representing the integrated effect of labor
productivity and the NAIRU on the deviation of nominal wage growth from the inﬂationary climate)13,









13We have E(ˆ p − π)=0 ,E(ˆ w − π)=0 .0045 and ¯ U
l = E(U
l)=0 .058.16
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Figure 5 Money Wage Phillips curve.
without losing any relevant information:
RSS 0.003941 ˆ σ 0.004641 R2 0.3755 ¯ R2 0.3686
lnL 1001 AIC −10.7297 HQ −10.7087 SC −10.6777
An F test of the speciﬁc against the general rejects only at a marginal rejection probability of 0.5238.
The properties of the estimated model (20) are illustrated in ﬁgure 5. The ﬁrst graph (upper LHS) shows
the ﬁt of the model over time; the second graph (upper RHS) plots the ﬁt against the actual values of
∆wt − πt; the third graph (lower LHS) plots the residuals and the last graph (lower RHS) the squared
residuals. The diagnostic test results shown in table 2 conﬁrm that (20) is a valid congruent reduction
of the general model in (19).
Table 2 Diagnostics.
Wage Phillips curve Price Phillips curve
Diagnostic test (19) (20) (21) (22)
FChow(1978:2) 0.993 [0.5161] 0.866 [0.7529] 0.431 [0.9999] 0.421 [1.0000]
FChow(1996:4) 0.983 [0.4829] 0.771 [0.7315] 0.635 [0.8672] 0.551 [0.9288]
χ2
normality 0.710 [0.7012] 0.361 [0.8347] 0.141 [0.9322] 0.483 [0.7856]
FAR(1−4) 1.915 [0.1105] 1.276 [0.2810] 2.426 [0.0503] 1.561 [0.1869]
FARCH(1−4) 1.506 [0.2030] 0.940 [0.4421] 1.472 [0.2133] 3.391 [0.0107]
Fhetero 0.615 [0.9634] 1.136 [0.3411] 0.928 [0.6072] 1.829 [0.0346]
Reported are the test statistic and the marginal rejection probability.
With respect to the theoretical wage Phillips curve (1)
ˆ w = βw1(¯ Ul − Ul) − βw2(u − uo)+κw(ˆ p + nx)+( 1− κw)(π + nx)17
we therefore obtain the quantitative expression
ˆ w =0 .0158 − 0.193Ul +0 .266ˆ p +0 .734π
We notice that the wage share and labor productivity do play no role in this speciﬁcation of the money-
wage Phillips curve. The result on the inﬂuence of the wage share is in line with the result obtained by
Blanchard and Katz (1999) for the US economy.
3.3 The price Phillips curve
Let us next provide an estimate of the price Phillips curve (2) for the US economy. We now model price
inﬂation in deviation from the inﬂation climate, ∆p−π, conditional on its own past, the history of wage
inﬂation, ∆w − π, overall labor productivity growth, ∆y − ∆ld, the degree of capital under-utilization,
Uc by means of the equation (21), and the error correction term, u:
∆pt − πt = νp +
5  
j=1
γppj (∆pt−j − πt−j)+
5  
j=1













t−j + αput−1 + εpt, (21)
where εpt is a white noise process. The general unrestricted model shows no indication of misspeciﬁc-
ation (see table 2) and explains a substantial fraction (63.8%) of inﬂation variability. Also note that the
standard error of the price Phillips curve is just half the standard error in the prediction of changes in
the wage level, namely 0.259%:
RSS 0.001072 ˆ σ 0.002589 R2 0.6376 ¯ R2 0.5810
lnL 1122 AIC −11.7843 HQ −11.6015 SC −11.3334
There is however a huge outlier (ˆ εpt > 3ˆ σ) associated with the oil price shock in 1974 (3) so a centered
impulse dummy, I(1974:3), was included.
Here, the model reduction process undertaken by PcGets limits the number of coefﬁcients to 9
(while starting again with 22) and results in the following price Phillips curve:









(∆pt−1 − πt−1)+ 0 .196
(0.0653)
















RSS 0.001161 ˆ σ 0.002562 R2 0.6074 ¯ R2 0.5897
lnL 1114 AIC −11.8870 HQ −11.8238 SC −11.7309
The reduction is accepted at a marginal rejection probability of 0.7093. The ﬁt of the model and the plot
of the estimation errors are displayed in ﬁgure 6.
The long-run price Phillips curve implied by (22) is given by:
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Figure 6 Price Phillips curve.
With respect to the theoretical price Phillips curve
ˆ p = βp1(¯ Uc − Uc)+βp2(u − uo)+κp(ˆ w − nx)+( 1− κp)π,
we therefore obtain the quantitative expression
ˆ p =0 .006 − 0.039Uc +0 .286 ˆ w +0 .714π,
where we ignore the dummy and the productivity term in the long-run Phillips curve.14 We notice that
the wage share and labor productivity do again play no role in this speciﬁcation of the money-wage
Phillips curve. The result that demand pressure matters more in the labor market than in the goods
market is in line with what is observed in Carlin and Soskice (1990, section 18.3.1), and the result that
ﬁrms are (slightly) more short-sighted than workers may be due to the smaller importance ﬁrms attach
to past observations of wage inﬂation.
3.4 System results
So far we have modeled the wage and price dynamics of the system by analyzing one equation at a
time. In the following we check for the simultaneity of the innovations to the price and wage inﬂation
equations. The efﬁciency of a single-equation model reduction approach as applied in the previous
subsection depends on the absence of instantaneous causality between ∆pt − πt and ∆wt − πt (see
Krolzig, 2001). This requires the diagonality of the variance-covariance matrix Σ when the two Phillips
14From the perspective of the theoretical equation just shown this gives by calculating the mean of U
c the values ¯ U
c =
0.18,n x =0 .004.19




Ajzt−j + Bqt +  t, (24)
which represents zt =( ∆ pt − πt,∆wt − πt)  as a ﬁfth-order vector autoregressive (VAR) process with
the vector of the exogenous variables qt =( 1 ,Uc
t−1,Ul
t−1,∆yt−1 − ∆ld
t−1,I(1974:3))  and the null-
restrictions found by PcGets being imposed. Also,  t is a vector white noise process with E[ t  
t]=Σ .
Estimating the system by FIML using PcGive10 (see Hendry and Doornik, 2001) gives almost
identical parameter estimates (not reported here) and a log-likelihood of the system of 1589.34. The
correlation of structural residuals in the ∆w − π and ∆p − π equation is just 0.00467, which is clearly
insigniﬁcant.15 Further support for the empirical Phillips curves (20) and (22) comes from a likelihood
ratio (LR) test of the over-identifying restrictions imposed by PcGets. With χ2(44) = 46.793[0.3585],
we can accept the reduction. The presence of instantaneous non-causality justiﬁes the model reduction
procedure employed here, which was based on applying PcGets to each single equation in a turn.
The inﬁnite-order vector moving average representation of the system corresponding to the system








where Ψ(L)=A(L)−1 and L is the lag operator. By accumulating all effects, z = A(1)−1Bq, we get
the results in table 3.
Table 3 Static long run solution.
Constant Uc Ul ∆y − ∆ld I(1974:3)




















∆w − ∆p 0.0071 +0.0313 −0.1493 +0.0509 −0.0107
Derived from the FIML estimates of the system in (24).
Note here that all signs are again as expected, but that the estimated parameters are now certain
compositions of the β,κ terms and are in line with the values of these parameters reported earlier.
Taking into account all dynamics effects of Ul and Uc on wage and price inﬂation, real wage growth
reacts stronger on the under-utilization of the factor labor Ul than of the factor capital Uc.
3.5 Are there adverse Rose effects?
The wage Phillips curve in (20) and the price Phillips curve in (22) can be solved for the two endogenous
variables ˆ w and ˆ p. The resulting reduced form representation of these equations is similar to equations
(8) and (9), but for wages and prices and simpliﬁed due to the eliminated Blanchard-Katz-type error
correction terms (i.e., βw2 = βp2 =0 ):
ˆ w − π = κ
 
βw1(¯ Ul − Ul)+κwβp1(¯ Uc − Uc)
 
(26)
15Note that under the null hypothesis, the FIML estimator of the system is given by OLS. So we can easily construct an LR
test of the hypothesis Σ12 =Σ 21 =0 . As the log-likelihood of the system under the restriction is 1587.51. Thus the LR test
of the restriction can be accepted with χ
2(1) = 3.6554[0.0559].20
ˆ p − π = κ
 
βp1(¯ Uc − Uc)+κpβw1(¯ Ul − Ul)
 
(27)
with κ =( 1− κw1κp1)−1.
For the US economy, we found that wages reacted stronger to demand pressure than prices (βw1 >
βp1), that βw2,β p2 and wage share inﬂuences as demand pressure corrections could be ignored (as
assumed in section 2) and that wage–earners are roughly equally short–sighted as ﬁrms (κw ≈ κp).
Furthermore, using the FIML estimates of the static long run solution of system ˆ w − π, ˆ p − π reported
in table 3, we have the following empirical equivalents of (26) and (27):
ˆ w − π ≈ 0.019 − 0.209Ul − 0.011Uc (28)
ˆ p − π ≈ 0.012 − 0.060Ul − 0.043Uc (29)
where we abstract from the dummy and productivity term.
These calculations imply with respect to the critical condition (α) derived in section 2,
α =( 1− κp)βw1ko − (1 − κw)βp1/yp ≈ 0.714 · 0.209 − 0.734 · 0.043 ≈ 0.118 > 0,
if we assume that k = K/(xL) and 1/yp = K/Y p are ratios of roughly similar size, which is likely
since full-employment output should be not too different from full-capacity output at the steady state.
Hence, the Rose effect will be of adverse nature if the side-condition i<cis met. For the US, this
condition has been investigated in Flaschel, Gong and Semmler (2001) in a somewhat different frame-
work (see Flaschel, Gong and Semmler, 2002a for the European evidence). Their estimated investment
parameters i is 0.136, which should be deﬁnitely lower than the marginal propensity to consume out of
wages.16 Thus the real wage or Rose effect is likely to be adverse. In addition to what is known for the
real rate of interest rate channel and the Mundell effect, increasing wage ﬂexibility might add further
instability to the economy. Advocating more wage ﬂexibility may thus not be as unproblematic as it is
generally believed.
Given the indication that the US wage-price spiral is characterized by adverse Rose effects, the
question arises which mechanisms stabilized the US economy over the post-war period by taming this
adverse real wage feedback mechanism. Some aspects of this issue will be theoretically investigated in
the remainder of the paper. But a thorough analysis from a global point of view must be left for future
theoretical and empirical research on core nonlinearities possibly characterizing the evolution of market
economies.
The results obtained show that (as long as goods demand depends positively on the wage share) the
wage-price spiral in its estimated form isunstable as the critical condition (α) creates apositive feedback
of the wage share on its rate of change. We stress again that the innovations for obtaining such a result
are the use of two measures of demand pressure and the distinction between temporary and permanent
cost pressure changes (in a cross-over fashion) for the wage and price Phillips curves employed in this
paper.
4 Wage ﬂexibility, instability and an extended interest rate rule
In section 2, we found that a sufﬁcient wage ﬂexibility supports economic stability. The imposed as-
sumption c<iensured that the effective demand and thus output are decreased by a rising wage share;
16In the context of our model, one might want to estimate the effective demand function y =[ ( n + g − i(ro − π)]/[(1 −
u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u]. In view of the local approach chosen, it would in fact sufﬁce to estimate a linear approximation of the
form y = a0 + a1u + a2(r − π),w h e r esign(a1)=sign(c − i) and a2 < 0 holds. However, in preliminary econometric
investigations, we found a1 being statistically insigniﬁcant so that no conclusions could be drawn regarding the sign of c − i.21
thus deviations from the steady-state equilibrium, are corrected by the normal reaction of the real wage
to activity changes. In contrast, sufﬁciently ﬂexible price levels (for given wage ﬂexibility) result in
an adverse reaction of the wage share, since a rising wage share stimulate further increases via output
contraction and deﬂation.
Motivated by the estimation results presented in the preceding section, we now consider the situation
where c>iand α>0 holds true with respect to the critical Rose condition (α). The violation of the
critical condition implies that ˆ u depends positively on y. In connection with c>i , i.e., yu > 0 it
generates a positive feedback from the wage share u onto its rate of change ˆ u. Thus sufﬁciently strong
wage ﬂexibility (relative to price ﬂexibility) is now destabilizing. This is the adverse type of Rose effect.
4.1 Instability due to an unmatched Rose effect
Here we consider the simpliﬁed wage-price dynamics (14) – (16) under the assumption i<cinstead of
(A.1). If, in the now considered situation, monetary policy is still inactive (A.4a), the Rose effect and
the Mundell effect are both destabilizing the private sector of the economy:
Proposition 4. (Private Sector Instability)
Assume i<c ,i . e . , y u > 0,α>0 and κp < 1. Then, under the assumptions (A.2) -
(A.4a) introduced earlier, the interior steady-state solution of the dynamics (14) – (16) is
essentially repelling (exhibits at least one positive root).
Let us consider again to what extent the interest rate policy (A.4b) can stabilize the economy and in
particular enforce the inﬂationary target ¯ π. We state here without proof that rule (A.4b) can stabilize the
previously considered situation if the adjustment speed of wages with respect to demand pressure in the
labor market is sufﬁciently low. However, this stability gets lost if wage ﬂexibility is made sufﬁciently
large as is asserted by the following proposition, where we assume κp =0for the sake of simplicity.
Proposition 5. (Instability by an Adverse Rose Effect)
We assume (in the case i<c ) an attracting steady-state situation due to the working of the
monetary policy rule (A.4b). Then: Increasing the parameter βw1 that characterizes wage
adjustment speed will eventually lead to instability of the steady state by way of a Hopf
bifurcation (if the parameters κp,i,β r are jointly chosen sufﬁciently small). There is no
reswitching to stability possible, once stability has been lost in this way.
Note that the proposition does not claim that there is a wage adjustment speed which implies in-
stability for any parameter value βr in the interest rate policy rule. It is also worth noting that the
instability result is less clear-cut when for example κp > 0 is considered. Furthermore, increasing the
adjustment speed βr may reduce the dynamic instability in the case κp =0(as the trace of the Jacobian
is made less positive thereby). In the next subsection we will however make use of another stabilizing
feature which we so far neglected in the considered dynamics due to assumption (A.2): the Blanchard
and Katz (1999) error correction term βw2(u − uo) in the money-wage Phillips curve.
4.2 Stability from Blanchard–Katz type ‘error correction’
We now analyze dynamics under the assumption βw2 > 0. Thus money wages react to deviations of the
wage share from its steady-state value. In this situation the following proposition holds true:
Proposition 6. (Blanchard-Katz Wage Share Correction)
Assume i<c ,i . e . , y u > 0,α>0 and κp < 1. Then, under the interest rate policy
rule (A.4b), a sufﬁciently large error correction parameter βw2 implies an attracting steady22
state for any given adjustment speed βπ > 0 and all price ﬂexibility parameters βp1 > 0.
This stability is established by way of a Hopf bifurcation which in a unique way separates
unstable from stable steady-state solutions.
We thus have the result that the Blanchard–Katz error correction term if sufﬁciently strong over-
comes the destabilizing forces of the adverse Rose effect in proposition 5.
Blanchard and Katz (1999) ﬁnd that the error correction term is higher in European countries than
in the US, where it is also in our estimates insigniﬁcant. So the empirical size of the parameter βw2 may
be too small to achieve the stability result of proposition 6. Therefore, we will again disregard the error
correction term in the money-wage Phillips curve (A.2) in the following, and instead focus on the role
of monetary policy in stabilizing the wage-price spiral.
4.3 Stability from an augmented Taylor rule
The question arises whether monetary policy can be of help to avoid the problematic features of the
adverse Rose effect. Assume now that there interest rates are determined by an augmented Taylor rule
of the form,
r = ρo + π + βr1(π − ¯ π)+βr2(u − uo),β r1,β r2 > 0, (30)
where the monetary authority responds to rising wage shares by interest rate increases in order to cool
down the economy, counter-balancing the initial increase in the wage share.
The static equilibrium condition is now given the
y =
n + g − i(ρ0 + βr1(π − ¯ π)+βr2(u − uo))
(1 − i)(1 − u)+( 1− c)u
.
Thus the augmented Taylor rule (30) gives rise to a negative dependence of output y on the inﬂationary
climate π as well as the wage share u.
We now consider the implications for the stability of the steady state:
Proposition 7. (Wage Gap Augmented Taylor Rule)
Assume i<c , α>0 and κp < 1. Then: A sufﬁciently large wage-share correction
parameter βr2 in the augmented Taylor rule (30) implies an attracting steady state for any
given adjustment speed βπ > 0 and all price ﬂexibility parameters βp1 > 0. This stability
is established by way of a Hopf bifurcation which in a unique way separates unstable from
stable steady-state solutions.
Thus, convergence to the balanced growth path of private sector of the considered economy is gen-
erated by a modiﬁed Taylor rule that is augmented by a term that transmits increases in the wage share
to increases in the nominal rate of interest. To our knowledge such an interest rate policy rule that gives
income policy a role to play in the adjustment of interest rates by the central bank has not yet been con-
sidered in the literature. This is due to the general neglect of adverse real wage or Rose effects which
induce an inﬂationary spiral independently from the one generated by the real rate of interest or Mundell
effect, though both of these mechanisms derive from the fact that real magnitudes always allow for two
interacting channels by their very deﬁnition, wages versus prices in the case of Rose effects and nominal
interest versus expected inﬂation in the case of Mundell effects.23
5 Conclusions
In context of the ‘Goldilocks economy’ ofthe late 1990s, Gordon (1998) stressed the need for explaining
the contrast between decelerating prices and accelerating wages as well as the much stronger fall of the
rate of unemployment than the rise of the rate of capital utilization. The coincidence of the two events
is exactly what our approach to the wage-price spiral would predict: wage inﬂation is driven by demand
and cost pressures on the labor market and price inﬂation is formed by the corresponding pressures on
the goods markets.
Based on the two Phillips curves, we investigated two important macrodynamic feedback chains in a
simple growth framework: (i)the conventional destabilizing Mundell effect and (ii) theless conventional
Rose effect, which has been fairly neglected in the literature on demand and supply driven macrodynam-
ics. We showed that the Mundell effect can be tamed by a standard Taylor rule. In contrast, the Rose
effect can assume four different types depending on wage and price ﬂexibilities, short-sightedness of
workers and ﬁrms with respect to their cost-pressure measures and marginal propensities to consume c
and invest i in particular (where we argued for i<c ). Empirical estimates for the US-economy then
suggested the presence of adverse Rose effects: the wage level is more ﬂexible than the price level with
respect to demand pressure (and workers roughly equally short-sighted as ﬁrms with respect to cost
pressure). We showed that this particular Rose effect can cause macroeconomic instabilities which can
not be tamed by a conventional Taylor rule. But the paper also demonstrated means by which adverse
real interest rate and real wage rate effects may be modiﬁed or dominated in such away that convergence
back to the interior steady state is again achieved. We proved that stability can be re-established by (i)
an error-correction term in the money-wage Phillips curve (as in Blanchard and Katz, 1999),17 working
with sufﬁcient strength, or (ii) a modiﬁed Taylor rule with monetary policy monitoring the labor share
(or real unit labor costs) and reacting in response to changes in the income distribution.
In this paper, we showed that adverse Rose effects are of empirical importance, and indicated ways
of how to deal with them by wage or interest rate policies. In future research, we intend to discuss
the role of Rose effects for high and low growth phases separately, taken account of the observation
that money wages may be more rigid in the latter phases than in the former ones (see Hoogenveen and
Kuipers, 2000, for a recent empirical conﬁrmation of such differences and Flaschel, Gong and Semmler,
2002b, for its application to a 6D Keynesian macrodynamics). The existence of a ‘kink’ in the money-
wage Phillips curve should in fact increase the estimated) wage ﬂexibility parameter further (in the
case where the kink is not in operation). Furthermore, the robustness of the empirical results should be
investigated (say, by analyzing the wage-price spiral in other OECD countries). Finally, more elaborate
models have to be considered to understand the feedback mechanisms from a broader perspective (see
Flaschel et al., 2001, 2002a, for ﬁrst attempts of the dynamic AS-AD variety).18
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A Appendices
A.1 The sectoral budget equations of the model
For reasons of completeness, we here brieﬂy present the budget equations of our four types of economic
agents (see Sargent, 1987, ch.1, for a closely related presentation of such budget equations, there for the
sectors of the conventional AS-AD growth model). Consider the following scenario for the allocation26
of labor, goods and assets:
cupY + ˙ Bd = upY +¯ rB (workers: consumption out of wage income and saving deposits)
pb ˙ Bd + pe ˙ Ed = B +( 1− u)pY (asset–holders: bond and equity holdings)
pI = pe ˙ E (ﬁrms: equity ﬁnanced investment)
¯ rB + B + pG = ˙ B + pb ˙ B (government: debt ﬁnanced consumption).
where g = G/K =const. In these budget equations we use a ﬁxed interest rate ¯ r for the saving deposits
of workers and use – besides equities – perpetuities (with price pb =1 /r) for the characterization of
the ﬁnancial assets held by asset-holders. Due to this choice, and due to the fact that investment was
assumed to depend on the long-term expected real rate of interest, we had to specify the Taylor rule
in terms of r in the body of the paper. These assumptions allow to avoid the treatment of the term
structure of interest rate which would make the model considerably more difﬁcult and thus the analysis
of Mundell orRose effects more advanced, but also less transparent. Forour purposes the above scenario
is however fully adequate and very simple to implement.
Furthermore, we denote in these equations the amount of saving deposits of workers by B (and
assume a ﬁxed interest rate ¯ r on these saving deposits). Outstanding bonds (consols or perpetuities)
are denoted by B and have as their price the usual expression pb =1 /r. We ﬁnally use pe for the
price of shares or equities E. These equations are only presented for consistency reasons here and they
immediately imply
p(Y − C − I − G)=(˙ Bd − ˙ B)+pb( ˙ Bd − ˙ B)+pe( ˙ Ed − ˙ E)=0 .
Wehave assumed goods–market equilibrium in this paper and assume in addition that all saving deposits
of workers are channeled into the government sector ( ˙ Bd = ˙ B). We thus can also assume equilibrium
in asset market ﬂows via a perfect substitute assumption (which determines pe, while pb is determined
by an appropriate interest rate policy rule in this paper). Note that ﬁrms are purely equity ﬁnanced and
pay out all proﬁts as dividends to the sector of asset holders. Note also that long-term bonds per unit of
capital b = B/(pK) will follow the law of motion
˙ b = r(b + g − swuy) − (ˆ p + ˆ K)b
which – when considered in isolation (all other variables kept at their steady-state values). – implies a
stable evolution of such government debt b towards a steady-state value for this ratio if ro−ˆ po = ρo <n
holds true. Since ﬁscal policy is not our concern in this paper we only brieﬂy remark that this is the case




Similarly, we have for the evolution of savings per unit of capital b = B/(pK) the law of motion
˙ b = swuy +(¯ r − (ˆ p + ˆ K))b
which – when considered in isolation – implies convergence to some ﬁnite steady-state value if ¯ r<
ˆ po + n holds true. Again, since the Government Budget Restraint is not our concern in this paper, we
have ignored this aspect of our model of wage–price and growth dynamics.27
A.2 Wage dynamics: theoretical foundation
This subsection builds on the paper by Blanchard and Katz (1999) and brieﬂy summarizes their theoret-
ical motivation of a money-wage Phillips curve which is closely related to our dynamic equation (1).19
Blanchard and Katz assume – following the suggestions of standard models of wage setting – that real
wage expectations of workers, ωe = wt − pe
t, are basically determined by the reservation wage, ¯ ωt,
current labor productivity, yt − ld
t, and the rate of unemployment, Ul
t:
ωe
t = θ¯ ωt +( 1− θ)(yt − ld
t) − βwUl
t.
Expected real wages are thus a Cobb-Douglas average of the reservation wage and output per worker,
but are departing from this normal level of expectations by the state of the demand pressure on the labor
market. The reservation wage in turn is determined as a Cobb-Douglas average of past real wages,
ωt−1 = wt−1 − pt−1, and current labor productivity, augmented by a factor a<0:
¯ ωt = a + λωt−1 +( 1− λ)(yt − ld
t)
Inserting the second into the ﬁrst equation results in
ωe
t = θa+ θλωt−1 +( 1− θλ)(yt − ld
t) − βwUl
t,
which gives after some rearrangements
∆wt = pe








t denotes the expected rate of inﬂation, ut−1 the past (log) wage share and ∆yt − ∆ld
t the
current growth rate of labor productivity. This is the growth law for nominal wages that ﬂows from the
theoretical models referred to in Blanchard and Katz (1999, p.70).
In this paper, we proposed to operationalize this theoretical approach to money-wage inﬂation by
replacing the short-run cost push term ∆pe
t by the weighted average κw∆pe
t +( 1− κw)πt,w h e r e∆pe
t
is determined by myopic perfect foresight. Thus, temporary changes in the correctly anticipated rate of
inﬂation do not have full impact on temporary wage inﬂation, which is also driven by lagged inﬂation
rates via the inﬂationary climate variable πt. Adding inertia to the theory of wage inﬂation introduced
a distinction between the temporary and persistent cost effects to this equation. Furthermore we have
that ∆yt − ∆ld
t = nx due to the assumed ﬁxed proportions technology. Altogether, we end up with am
equation for wage inﬂation of the type presented in section 2.1, though now with a speciﬁc interpretation
of the model’s parameters from the perspective of efﬁciency wage or bargaining models.20
A.3 Price dynamics: theoretical foundation
We here follow again Blanchard and Katz (1999, IV.), see also Carlin and Soskice (1990, ch.18), and
start from the assumption of normal cost pricing, here under the additional assumption of our paper of
19In this section, lower case letters (including w and p) indicate logarithms.
20Note that the parameter in front of ut−1 can now not be interpreted as a speed of adjustment coefﬁcient. Note furthermore
that Blanchard and Katz (1999) assume that, in the steady state, the wage share is determined by the ﬁrms’ markup u = −µ
(both in logs) to be discussed in the next subsection. Therefore the NAIRU can be determined endogenously on the labor









. The NAIRU of their model therefore depends on both labor and
goods market characteristics in contrast to the NAIRU levels for labor and capital employed in our approach.28
ﬁxed proportions in production and Harrod neutral technological change. We therefore consider as rule
for normal prices
pt = µt + wt + ld
t − yt, i.e., ∆pt =∆ µt +∆ wt − nx,
where µt represents a markup on the unit wage costs of ﬁrms and where again myopic perfect foresight,
here with respect to wage setting is assumed. We assume furthermore that the markup is variable and
responding to the demand pressure in the market for goods ¯ Uc − Uc
t , depending in addition negatively
on the current level of the markup µt in its deviation from the normal level ¯ µ. Firms therefore depart
from their normal cost pricing rule according to the state of demand on the market for goods, and this
the stronger the lower the level of the currently prevailing markup has been (markup smoothing). For
sake of concreteness let us here assume that the following behavioral relationship holds:
∆µt = βp(¯ Uc − Uc
t−1)+γ(¯ µ − µt−1),
where γ>0. Inserted into the formula for price inﬂation this in sum gives:
∆pt = βp(¯ Uc − Uc
t−1)+γ(¯ µ − µt−1)+( ∆ wt − nx)
In terms of the logged wage share ut = −µt we get
∆pt = βp(¯ Uc − Uc
t−1)+γ(ut−1 − ¯ u)+( ∆ wt − nx).
As in the preceding subsection of the paper, we again add persistence the cost pressure term ∆wt − nx
now in the price Phillips curve in the form of the inﬂationary climate expression π and thereby obtain
in sum the equation (2) of section 2.1.
A.4 Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions and Hopf bifurcations
We consider the matrix of partial derivatives at the steady state of the 3D dynamical systems of this











We deﬁne the principal minors of order 2 of this matrix by the following three determinants:
J1 =
   
 
   
J22 J23
J32 J33
   
 
   
,J 2 =
   
 
   
J11 J13
J31 J33
   
 
   
,J 3 =
   
 
   
J11 J12
J21 J22
   
 
   
We furthermore denote by a1 the negative of the trace of the Jacobian −traceJ,b ya2 the sum of the
above three principal minors, and by a3 the negative of the determinant |J| of the Jacobian J. We note
that the coefﬁcients ai,i=1 ,2,3 are the coefﬁcients of the characteristic polynomial of the matrix J.
The Routh Hurwitz conditions (see Lorenz, 1993) then state that the eigenvalues of the matrix J all
have negative real parts if and only if
ai > 0,i=1 ,2,3 and a1a2 − a3 > 0.
These conditions therefore exactly characterize the case where local asymptotic stability of the con-
sidered steady state is given.29
Supercritical Hopf bifurcations (the birth of a stable limit cycle) or subcritical Hopf bifurcations
(the death of an unstable limit cycle) occur (if asymptotic stability prevailed below this parameter value)
when the following conditions hold simultaneously for an increase of a parameter β of the model (see
Wiggins, 1993, ch.3):
a3(β) > 0,(a1a2 − a3)(β)=0 ,(a1a2 − a3) (β) > 0.
We note here that the dynamics considered below indeed generally fulﬁll the condition a3 > 0 and also
J2 =0 , the latter up to proposition 6 and due to the proportionality that exists between the laws of
motion (14), (16) with respect to the state variables u,π.
A.5 Proofs of propositions
In the following we present the mathematical proofs of the propositions 2 – 7 of the paper. The proofs
involve the stability analysis of the 3D dynamics in (14) to (16) under certain parametric assumptions
and different monetary regimes and are based on the Routh-Hurwitz conditions just considered.
Proof of Proposition 2: Choosing βp1 or βπ sufﬁciently large will make the trace of J, the Jacobian
of the dynamics (14) – (16) at the steady state, unambiguously positive and thus deﬁnitely lead to local
instability.
Yet, even if βp1 and βπ are sufﬁciently small, we get by appropriate row operations in the considered
determinant the following sequence of result for the sign of detJ:
|J| ˆ =
 
   







   
   
 
 
ˆ = − (+)
   




   
   
 
ˆ =
   




   




   







   
   
=
y0
(1 − u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u
 
   




   
   
=
cy0
(1 − u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u
> 0
One of the necessary and sufﬁcient Routh-Hurwitz conditions for local asymptotic stability is
therefore always violated, independently of the sizes of the considered speeds of adjustment.
Proof of Proposition 3: Inserting the interest rule in (A.4b) into the y(u,π) and i(ρ − (r − π))
functions gives rise to the functional dependencies
y = y(u,π)=
n + g − i[ρ0 + βr(π − ¯ π)]
(1 − u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u
,y u < 0,y π < 0,
i = i(ρ − (r − π)) = i(u,π),i u < 0,i π < 0.











if βp1 is chosen sufﬁciently small (and thus dominated by wage ﬂexibility βw1). We thus then have
trace J<0( a1 = − trace J>0)a n d
J3 =
   




   
   
 
> 0,J 1 =
   




   
   
 
> 0, i.e. ,
a2 = J1 + J2 + J3 > 0 for βp1 sufﬁciently small. Next, we get for |J| with respect to signs:
|J| ˆ =
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−1 −1
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since N =( 1− u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u>0 at the steady state. Therefore: a1,a 2,a 3 = −|J| are all
positive.
It remains to be shown that also a1a2 − a3 > 0 can be fulﬁlled. Here it sufﬁces to observe that
a1,a 2 stay positive when βp1 =0is assumed, while a3 becomes zero then. Therefore a1a2−a3 > 0 for
all adjustment parameters βp1 chosen sufﬁciently small. These qualitative results hold independently of
the size of βπ and βr (with an adjusting size of βp1 however).
Note in addition that the trace of J is given by
κβp1/yp[(1 − κw)(i − c)y − βπβri]/((1 − i)(1 − u)+( 1− c)u)
as far as its dependence on the parameter βp1 is concerned. Choosing βπ orβr,for given βp1,sufﬁciently
small will make the trace of J positive and thus make the steady state of the considered dynamics locally
unstable.











and thus in particular trace J>0 and
|J|ˆ =
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++
   
 
   
> 0.
Thus there is at least one positive real root, which establishes the local instability of the investigated
interior steady state solution.











This Jacobian ﬁrst of all implies
|J|ˆ =
 
   
   





   
   
   
= −(+)
   




   
   
 
< 0
and thus for the Routh-Hurwitz condition a3 = −|J| > 0 as necessary condition for local asymptotic
stability. We assert here without detailed proof that local stability will indeed prevail if βw1 is chosen
sufﬁciently close tozero, since |J|willbe close tozero then tooand since theRouth-Hurwitz coefﬁcients
a1,a 2 are both positive and bounded away from zero. Wages that react sluggishly with respect to
demand pressure therefore produce local stability in the case c>i .
This is indeed achieved for example by the assumption κp =0 : Obviously, trace of J is then an
increasing linear function of the speed parameter βw1 in the considered situation, since this parameter
is then only present in J11 and not in J33. This proves the ﬁrst part of the assertion, if note is taken of
the fact that |J| does not change its sign. Eigenvalues therefore cannot pass through zero (and the speed
condition for them is also easily veriﬁed). The second part follows from the fact that a1a2−a3 becomes
zero before trace J = −a1 passes through zero, but cannot become positive again before this trace has
become zero (since a1a2 − a3 is a quadratic function of the parameter βw1 with a positive parameter
before the quadratic term and since this function is negative at the value βw1 where trace J has become
zero).











if βw2 is chosen sufﬁciently large (and thus dominating the wage ﬂexibility βw1 term). We thus have
trace J<0 (a1 = −traceJ>0)a n d
J3 =
 
   




   
   
> 0,J 1 =
 
   




   
   
> 0, signJ2 = sign
 
   




   
   
> 0, i.e. ,
a2 = J1 + J2 + J3 > 0, in particular due to the fact that the βwi,i=1 ,2-expressions can be removed
from the second row of J2 without altering the size of this determinant.
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since the βwi,i=1 ,2-expressions can again be removed now from the third row of |J| without altering
t h es i z eo ft h i sd e t e r m i n a n t .
Therefore: a1, a2,a n da3 = −|J| are all positive as demanded by the Routh-Hurwitz conditions
for local asymptotic stability. There remains to be shown that also a1a2 − a3 > 0 can be fulﬁlled. In
the present situation this however is an easy task, since – as just shown – |J| does not depend on the32
parameter βw2, while a1a2 depends positively on it (in the usual quadratic way). Finally, the statement
on the Hopf bifurcation can be proved in a similar way as the one in proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 7: Inserting the Taylor rule
r = ρo + π + βr1(π − ¯ π)+βr2(u − uo),β r1,β r2 > 0
into the effective demand equation
y =
n + g − i(ro − π)
(1 − u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u
adds the term
˜ y = −
iβr2(u − uo)
(1 − u)(1 − i)+( 1− c)u
to our former calculations – in the place of the βw2 term now. This term gives rise to the following
additional partial derivative
˜ yu = −
iβr2
(1 − uo)(1 − i)+( 1− c)uo
at the steady state of the economy. This addition can be exploited as the βw2 expression in the previous
subsection used there to prove proposition 7.